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Abstract. Integrated Circuits (ICs) are the cardinal elements of modern electrical, 
electronic and electro-mechanical systems. Amid global outsourcing of ICs’ design 
and fabrication and their growing applications in smart manufacturing or Industrie 
4.0, various hardware security threats and issues of trust have also emerged. IC 
piracy, counterfeiting, and hardware Trojans (HTs) are some of the key hardware 
threats that merit the attention of manufacturing community. It is worth noting that 
the lower abstraction levels (ICs) are falsely assumed to operate securely. The 
proposition, therefore, is that if an operating system (higher abstraction level) is 
considered to be secure while operating on a compromised IC (lower abstraction 
level), would it be prudent to regard this implementation as secure? The purpose of 
this paper is to highlight IC level threats with an emphasis on hardware Trojans that 
pose a significant threat to smart manufacturing environment in the wake of 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).  
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1. Introduction 
Electronics, conceivably more than any other realm of technology, has undergone an 
explosive evolution in the last five decades. Sophisticated Integrated Circuits (ICs) like 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), Complex Programmable Logic Devices 
(CPLDs) and Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) have been seminal in this 
extraordinary phenomenon of technological growth. These circuits constitute the 
building blocks of consumer and industrial electronics. They help sustain national and 
international computer networks, manage transportation and power grids, and warrant 
the competitiveness of defence systems. The Internet of Things  (IoT), autonomous 
vehicles, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber-physical systems (CPS), and industrie 4.0, all 
rely on optimised designing and implementation of integrated circuits. Concurrently, 
their optimisation implies a safe, reliable, and secure deliverance of the designed 
functionality and intended operation. 
Till the last decade, the IC-level (hardware) of processing and computational 
systems either in System-on-Chip (SoC) or Network-on-Chip (NoC) configuration, was 
considered highly secure. The main onus had been on the Operating System-level 
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(software) for security breaches and malfunctioning of systems. However, with the 
global outsourcing of IC supply chain (Figure 1), a number of hardware oriented security 
threats as shown in Figure 2 have emerged, thereby raising issues of trustworthiness. 
These threats aim at leaking embedded secret keys and sensitive data, disabling vital 
system functionalities, degrading system performance, and accelerating device ageing 
process. 
Figure 1. Integrated Circuit Supply Chain and Trustworthiness [4]. 
Figure 2. Hardware (Integrated Circuit-based) Threats. 
With the industrial domain entering the fourth revolution, called Industrie 4.0 or smart 
manufacturing, the significance of becoming aware of IC-level security apart from high-
level software and cybersecurity has increased manifold. Hardware Trojans, in particular, 
are being regarded as the major security concern for both the academia and industry 
[1-2]. In smart manufacturing domain, the focus is more on high-level security including 
device-security, server data security, and secure gateway [3]. There is no substantial 
work at the IC-level security, especially in the wake of hardware Trojans.  
This paper, therefore, aims to fill this gap and familiarize the manufacturing 
community with the phenomena of hardware Trojans in integrated circuits - the bedrock 
of every electronic, electrical, and electro-mechanical system. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the phenomenon of hardware Trojans. Section 
EDA – Electronic Design Automation 
3 provides various hardware Trojan detection techniques and Section 4 draws the 
conclusion. 
2. Hardware Trojans – Phenomenon and Classification 
Hardware Trojan is defined as “a malicious, intentional modification of a circuit design 
that results in an undesired behaviour when the circuit is deployed ” [2]. Bhunia et al.
[5] have very aptly described hardware Trojan attack as “a malicious modification of an 
IC during design or fabrication in an untrusted design house or foundry, which involves 
untrusted people, design tools, or components”. Referring back to Greek mythology of 
‘Trojan Horse’, these hardware Trojans exhibit the similar stealthy nature and go 
undetected until activated by a rare event or condition.   
 As depicted in Figure 3, a typical hardware Trojan is designed to have ‘Trigger’ 
and ‘Payload’ logic [5]. Hardware Trojan action is initiated once the trigger input is 
received which, in turn, incites the payload to perform a specific attack. This could be a 
‘Time Bomb’ disabling and damaging the circuit or a ‘Backdoor’ leaking sensitive data 
to an adversary.  
             Figure 3. Hardware Trojan – Trigger and Payload [5]. 
Considering the IC supply chain (Figure 1), there can be a number of ill-intentioned 
proliferations by an adversary. These could be a modification of any specific line or 
paragraph of specifications, insertion of an extra line of source code, alteration in CMOS 
(Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor) geometries employed or sub-micron level 
modification in silicon die during fabrication stage. These Trojans can find their 
implementation in microprocessors, microcontrollers, Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLCs), Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), and Application Specific Integrated 
Circuits (ASICs).   
2.1. Hardware Trojan Example 
In order to explain the phenomenon of Hardware Trojan, consider the example of a CNC 
Motion Controller IC on the controller board in Figure 4. This chip or an integrated 
circuit is a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), which is designed to function as a 
microcontroller. It sends precise signals to servo drives and amplifiers for controlling 
position, velocity and acceleration of the load along multiple axes. The feedback signal 
from an amplifier is analyzed by the microcontroller and error, if any,  is corrected and 
sent back to the amplifier for a desired output. However, if this FPGA is added with the 
Trojan gates and wires (indicated in red) that get activated with a specific high operating 
junction temperature, the error correction will not be generated. Instead, it will result in 
the malfunction and erratic motion profile of the CNC machine.  
Figure 4. Hardware Trojan Example – Microcontroller on CNC Motion Controller board is inserted with 
Trojan gates and wires (indicated in red).
2.2. Hardware Trojans’ (HTs) Taxonomy 
Based upon the ‘trigger’ and ‘payload’ circuits’ criterion, Wolff et al. [6] proposed the 
first taxonomy for HTs in 2008 followed by several revisions [7-10]. However, the most 
comprehensive classification of HTs made till to date is by Tehranipoor et al. [11] and 
Moein et al. [12]. Figure 5 represents the current taxonomy of Hardware Trojans. It is 
based on six hardware Trojan attributes as indicated in the figure below. 
Figure 5. Hardware Trojans Taxonomy based on six attributes [11].
Insertion phase implies adding of extra circuitry or coding to the original IC design 
during any point of IC supply chain. The level of Abstraction indicates the control and 
flexibility an attacker may exercise on implementing HT. Activation mechanism 
defines the triggering of HT internally or externally or always remaining active. Effect 
determines the payload types of HT which could be changing the function of an IC, 
reducing its reliability etc. Location characterizes the placement of HT in any part of the 
circuit. Physical characteristics determine the alteration effected by HT in the 
functional or parametric elements, the spatial distribution within the circuit etc. How far 
these classifications have benefitted HT detection and counter-measuring is yet to be 
seen. Salmani et al. [11] have critiqued the existing ad hoc nature of metrics and ‘home-
grown Trojans’ along with varying assumptions for comparing various HT detection 
techniques. Accordingly, they have developed a suite of Trojans and ‘Trust Benchmarks’ 
to standardize and organize work on hardware Trojans [11]. 
3. Hardware Trojans – Detection Techniques 
It may be well understood that even for a simple integrated circuit comprising a moderate 
gate density, the number of HT models with changing activation mechanisms and 
different effects may be substantial. As a result, devising a universal HT detection 
method for all HT infested ICs is highly improbable. Nevertheless, relentless efforts are 
being made to improve hardware security at micro-architectural level, encompassing 
both the detection and mitigation. The focus of this paper is, however, on HT detection. 
Figure 6. Hardware Trojans Taxonomy based on detection techniques [2].
As can be seen in Figure 6, Trojan detection at pre-silicon stage considers 
functional validation of IC design by generating different test patterns and carrying out 
a simulation to detect HTs. It is important to know that intellectual property (IP) cores 
act as black boxes in the circuit design. It is, therefore, vital to develop IP trust 
verification methods. A technique called VeriTrust [13] is used to pinpoint suspicious 
gates that are not driven by any dedicated trigger inputs. It may be noted that such inputs 
are not sensitized with verification test cases. Manual post-processing is, therefore, 
sometimes required to further analyse suspicious gates for confirmation, which is one of 
its main limitations. Formal verification is another viable pre-silicon stage technique that 
employs an algorithmic-based approach to verify logic if it satisfies the pre-defined 
security vectors. The recent methods being used for formal verification include 
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‘equivalence checking’, ‘property checking’ [14] and model checking [15]. Similarly, 
[16] have proposed a method which compares two analogous but untrusted designs for 
all possible input combination vectors to determine the functional differences between 
them.  
Considering ‘Trojan Detection’ at the post-silicon stage of an IC, both the non-
destructive and destructive testing can be undertaken. In case of non-destructive testing, 
we suggest the analysis of un-programmed blank devices to determine their default 
output values and verify their electrical characteristics as per the datasheet. At the die-
level and wire bound area, X-ray imaging [17] is deemed suitable; however, damaging 
effects of radiations may be kept in mind. Destructive method, on the other hand, 
employs IC de-capping and de-packaging. In addition to this, visual inspection and 
imaging techniques like scanning electron microscopy (SEM) [18] and scanning optical 
microscopy (SOM) [19] are also used to detect HTs inside the IC die. The downside, 
however, is the requirement of known-good ICs (golden ICs) for comparison, more time-
consumption and complex testing with ever-increasing transistor densities. Moreover, 
the high cost of detection and IC destruction render destructive testing as unviable.
4. Conclusion 
Integrated circuits are the bedrock of the existing state-of-the-art technologies. With 
enormous applications in industrie 4.0, IIoT, and cyber-physical systems in smart 
manufacturing environment, sophisticated types of integrated circuits will remain at the 
root of their optimised operations. The emergence of hardware security threats at the 
micro-architectural level of digital designs needs to be contemplated holistically in the 
smart manufacturing environment, in particular. Hardware Trojans, the intentional 
malicious modifications in integrated circuits, pose a major security concern for the 
manufacturing community. We, as a part of this community, have attempted to put forth 
a brief insight into the phenomenon of hardware Trojans in integrated circuits and 
highlight their debilitating impact on integrated circuit security, which in turn may 
jeopardise the safe and secure functioning of smart manufacturing systems.  
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